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Nominalists deny the existence of abstract objects.1 In view of the notoriously
shadowy and intractable character of the latter, the formers’ thesis certainly has a
strong initial appeal to anyone sharing even the least bit of a naturalistic bent. But
even though many philosophers nowadays do exhibit this inclination, the vices and
virtues of nominalism remain a live issue in contemporary debates.
The reason for this is that proponents of nominalism with regard to some sort of
alleged entity are usually seen to carry the burden of proof; it is expected that they
demonstrate how one can actually get by without the entities in question. A philosopher
who claims that, e.g., numbers do not exist, immediately has to face the fact that
talk of numbers is ubiquitous in virtually any serious scientific endeavor. Since most
nominalists show the broadly naturalistic tendencies I alluded to, this philosopher will
normally be very reluctant to call for a grand revision of entrenched scientific practices
on the grounds of her philosophical position. Accordingly, she will have to come up with
methods of systematically reconstructing or reinterpreting portions of science seemingly
committed to numbers in a way that eventually renders them ontologically innocuous,
whilst retaining as many of the benefits as possible. Wether or not nominalists can
fulfill this task satisfactorily is the question that keeps fuelling the debate despite the
prima facie plausibility of nominalism.
There is no universally agreed-upon methodology that gets applied in such discus-
sions. Sometimes nominalistic proposals are introduced in a very informal way that
does not make it all too easy to assess their respective merits.2 I believe, however,
that it is possible to give rock solid arguments in favor or against certain nominalistic
1Of course this is a rather dubious sweeping statement. Versions of nominalism have been proposed
that have no bearing whatsoever on the abstract-concrete distinction. I will not get into any of these
in this paper. Instead I shall take the rejection of abstract objects as the defining criterion for being
a nominalist.
2For a simple example that also served as an inspiration for this paper, cf. [Quine(1980), p.117],
where it is ‘shown’ how a theory of (abstract) lengths might be reduced to a theory of physical objects.
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reconstructions, once one moves into the realm of more formal investigations.
Ideally, we should be able to codify the platonistic orthodoxy as well as the nom-
inalist’s alternative ideas as two formal theories. Then the question of whether the
reconstruction can succeed may be treated as a clear and distinct (meta-)logical prob-
lem: is the platonist’s theory relatively interpretable in the nominalist’s theory? I.e.
can any platonistic arguments be sufficiently simulated in the nominalistic context,
rendering platonism a harmless fac¸on de parler – in a very rigorous sense.3
This paper is intended as a case study. I do not propose a general way of developing
nominalistic theories, and I cannot show for arbitrary platonistic theories how they can
be based on ontologically more parsimonious alternatives. I will, however, explore how
to proceed with this in one particular field of enquiry: the theory of concatenation.
For describing formal languages and investigating the behavior of proofs, theories,
and related subject matter, one needs a theory of syntax. In introductory textbooks
and logic courses this role is usually played by a rather simple and informal fragment
of set theory. More advanced texts on meta-mathematics, where precision is valued
higher than accessibility and intuitiveness, almost uniformly rely on some formalized
arithmetic for this task. Both these approaches seem philosophically unsatisfactory
to me: the former mostly because it lacks rigor and too much is habitually left unsaid
about the theoretical framework. But more importantly, both methods have in common
the fundamental oddity that, in the end, one has to rely on heavy duty mathematical
theories to prove facts about linguistic objects. Even more curiously, it turns out that
from these perspectives, linguistic objects really are either sets or numbers.
This is where nominalistic worries enter. It would seem that terms, formulae, sen-
tences, proofs etc. are quite concrete objects: chalk or ink traces on blackboards or
sheets of paper. I find it baffling and certainly undesirable that we should be forced to
make all sorts of assumptions about such elusive things as the natural numbers or even
the set universe in order to find out facts about objects with which we seem to be so
well acquainted.
So we are faced with a twofold diagnosis: (i) the standard syntax of formal languages
takes a detour through specifically mathematical theories to talk about linguistic ob-
jects, and (ii) standard syntax takes a detour through the realm of abstract objects to
3Working with the notion of relative interpretability like this is, admittedly, only one of many
possibilities of associating the broader philosophical issues with well-defined meta-mathematical ones.
See, for instance, [Burgess and Rosen(1997)] for a different, yet somewhat related idea.
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talk about very concrete things. What we need to rectify this situation is a theory that
– on the one hand – is tailored to treat linguistic subject matter and – on the other
hand – is also not susceptible to criticism on grounds of ontological parsimony.
The first step is easily taken. One can utilize the theory TC as proposed by
[Grzegorczyk(2005)]. TC is formulated in the first-order language with two individ-
ual constants ‘a’ and ‘b’ as well as the two-place function symbol ‘◦’4, by taking (the
universal closures of) the following formulae as axioms:
TC1. (x ◦ y) ◦ z = x ◦ (y ◦ z)
TC2. x◦y = u◦v → (x = u∧y = v)∨∃w((x◦w = u∧w◦v = y)∨(u◦w = x∧w◦y = v))
TC3. x ◦ y 6= a
TC4. x ◦ y 6= b
TC5. a 6= b
We give an informal interpretation to LTC by specifying as the intended range of its
variables the set of strings that can be formed out of just two different atomic symbols
that the two individual constants are understood to respectively refer to. The circle is
read as the operation of concatenating two strings or, in more everyday language, the
operation of taking one string and immediately following it with another string on its
right side.
It is plain to see that under this interpretation all five axioms turn out true. In
the cases of TC1 and TC3-5, this is outright obvious: it should not be controversial
that concatenation is associative: as far as the resulting string is concerned, it does not
make a difference wether we first concatenate strings σ and τ and then follow the result
by a third string ρ or we first concatenate τ with ρ and prefix the result of that by σ.
As for axioms TC3-5 – they just give expression to the fact that we are dealing with
two distinct primitive symbols, neither of which is itself a concatenate.
Only TC2 can look a little confusing at first sight. It is, however, quite straight-
forward what this formula states under the given informal reading: If a string is par-
titioned into two strings in different ways, then there will always exist an interpolant,
i.e. a string that lies between the two ‘borders’. In [Grzegorczyk and Zdanowski(2008)]
TC2 is called the editor axiom, because it describes what happens when two editors
4Let us call this language LTC .
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independently of each other are faced with the task of publishing the same text in two
volumes. They either end up producing the same two volumes or one of them will
distribute the text in such a way that some part of it is put at the end of volume 1,
while the other has that very segment opening volume 2. With this illustration in mind,
it should be fair enough to conclude that TC2, interpreted in the given manner, also
states a truth about strings.
The characteristic ideas for TC actually originated in [Tarski(1935)], and related
variants have been studied, e.g., by [Quine(1981)] and [Martin(1958)]; it is just the
simple first-order formulation I use that is drawn from Grzegorczyk’s paper. TC is
mutually interpretable with Robinson’s arithmetic Q5 and, accordingly, the well-known
applicability of the latter to the task of developing fundamental bits of syntax is directly
inherited by the former.
Since the exact treatment of formal syntax in TC is not my primary concern here,
I shall leave it at that. Let us just take this fact about the proof-theoretic strength of
TC as evidence enough that part (i) of my diagnosis above – concerning the reliance
on mathematical theories for investigating linguistic objects that permeates the logical
literature – can more or less easily be answered by working with the non-mathematical
TC, which delivers just enough resources.6
Let us turn to the really pressing issue: abstract objects. As i said before, there is
good reason to think that the strings of symbols that we really encounter when dealing
with formal languages are quite concrete. We now have to ask ourselves whether in
moving to TC as our theory of syntax we have also remedied problem (ii)—the oddity
that we normally posit a host of abstract objects in order to prove facts about those
very tangible traces of chalk or ink. Is TC a nominalistically acceptable theory?
My answer to this question cannot draw on any general principle for determining
the ontological commitments of formal theories and what they mean with regard to the
debate about nominalism. Such a criterion would of course be very helpful, but it turns
out to be surprisingly hard to pin down.7
I want to argue that TC is indeed a highly platonistic theory. For this I will only
5Cf. [Grzegorczyk(2005)], [Grzegorczyk and Zdanowski(2008)], [Sˇvejdar(2009)], [Visser(2009)], and
[Ganea(2009)] for this and a variety of related results about TC and some of its variants.
6A fair question is why TC should not be a mathematical theory. Does it not look like just a bunch
of fairly general algebraic principles? I confess that I cannot quickly produce a useful criterion as to
what seperates a mathematical theory from a non-mathematical one. But I am content to respond to
this by pointing out that TC was designed with the linguistic field of application in mind and hence
maybe we need not count it as essentially mathematical.
7On close inspection, Quine’s celebrated attempts at providing such a criterion all fail spectacularly.
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offer one simple thought: The formula ‘∀xy∃z(z = x ◦ y)’ is easily proved in TC. Thus,
if TC really is the theory of signs and their concatenates, then for any given pair of
strings there exists a string that is the concatenate of them. This quite clearly includes
the case of any string and itself. I claim: strings that behave like this cannot be concrete
markings of chalk on a blackboard!8
We certainly cannot produce an ‘a’-trace on a board and follow it by itself to generate
a new, longer trace. The only thing we could do is leave another mark of sufficiently
similar shape behind the first one, but this is obviously not the same. From this I
conclude that the subject matter of TC certainly cannot be the concrete objects that I
would favor to talk about in syntax. TC is a theory of expression types—the abstract
shapes that similar strings supposedly instantiate. So we definitely have not dealt with
diagnosis (ii). We did not get rid of abstract objects so far!
Hence, what we need to look for is an alternative theory that can be read as being
concerned with string tokens, and that is also capable of producing a nominalistic
reconstruction of TC.
My proposal for a nominalistic theory of concatenation has to start by taking seri-
ously the demand for a language without LTC ’s tacit platonism. That means we need
to lose the presupposition that there exists, e.g., the symbol denoted by ‘a’. Rather we
should think of a plethora of primitive tokens that all exhibit the a-shape but really are
quite different from one another. We also have to avoid the use of a function constant
to speak about concatenation. The reason for this is that in classical logic functions
are always assumed to be total, meaning that the value of a function has to be defined
for any choice of arguments. We already saw that token concatenation cannot be total,
because there is no concatenate of any string token and itself.
Let LNTC be defined by the following non-logical vocabulary (with its intended
informal interpretation): one-place predicates ‘A’ and ‘B’ (for being an A-, resp. a
B-token), a two-place predicate ‘≈’ (indicating shape-similarity of strings), and a three-
place predicate ‘C’ (where ‘Cxyz’ is to be read as expressing that x is a concatenate of
y and z).
Now for the theory I call NTC. As I said before, the ideas underlying the non-
logical axioms of TC should not be too controversial, even for nominalists. Once we
express them in our non-platonistic language, they are definite candidates for being
8Note that the theorem is proved just by identity logic, existential, and universal generalization;
we do not even use any of the non-logical axioms. TC’s platonism thus seems to already be built into
the classical background logic and its interaction with LTC , specifically the use of function terms.
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true principles governing string tokens.
NTC1. Cwxy ∧ Cw′yz → (Cuwz ↔ Cuxw′)
NTC2. Czxy ∧ Czuv → (x = u ∧ y = v) ∨ ∃w((Cuxw ∧ Cywv) ∨ (Cxuw ∧ Cvwy))
NTC3. Cxyz → ¬Ax
NTC4. Cxyz → ¬Bx
NTC5. Ax ∧By → x 6= y
Interestingly, once one drops the singular-type treatment of primitive symbols as
well as the total-function understanding of concatenation, these axioms do not state
that much anymore. All the existence presuppositions have succesfully been removed,
as is seen by the fact that from the given axioms it is not provable that there are any
A- or B-tokens or concatenates!
This makes the theory that would result from NTC1− 5 quite uninteresting. It is,
however, very helpful in understanding what is going on, since we are now forced to
make explicit any existence claims we want to work with when trying to nominalistically
simulate TC.9
I propose the following as plausible further axioms: (a) there are A- and B-tokens,
(b) token concatenation is unique—if a concatenate of two strings exists, it is the only
one, (c) two strings can be concatenated iff they do not share a common part, and (d)
string parthood is transitive.
In order to express these principles in the formal language, I will rely on the following
definitions:
• x vini y :↔ x = y ∨ ∃zCyxz
• x vend y :↔ x = y ∨ ∃zCyzx
• x v y :↔ x vini y ∨ x vend y ∨ ∃uvw(Cuxv ∧ Cywu)
Here are the resulting new axioms:
NTC6. ∃xAx
9The type perspective on strings could directly be restored by adding as additional postulates the
existence of exactly one A- and exactly one B-object as well as the functionality of ‘C’. In this manner,
a very direct simulation of TC could obviously be reached, retaining its vicious platonism – but we
definitely want to avoid this, so we have to find another way.
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NTC7. ∃xBx
NTC8. Cxyz ∧ Cwyz → x = w
NTC9. ¬∃z(z v x ∧ z v y)↔ ∃zCzxy
NTC10. x v y → (y v z → x v z)
Four of these I expect to be uncontroversial under the intended interpretation of
LNTC . Only NTC9 might raise some suspicion, especially the implication from left to
right. Are there not, e.g. on this page, lots of pairs of strings that do not have any
substrings in common, yet still there is no concatenate of them? For instance, take the
very first word and the last one as such a couple.
This is a fair point and it forces me to be more specific about a topic that until now
I have carefully avoided: which objects specifically are the variables of LNTC supposed
to be ranging over under the intended interpretation?
The remark I just made about NTC9 dictates that a very narrow understanding
of string tokens as actually physically present, uninterrupted inscriptions on a certain
piece of paper is not too congenial with the axioms I proposed. To incorporate this,
we would have to be more restrictive and impose further conditions on the existence
of concatenates. For instance, we might say that strings need to be positioned directly
adjacent for there being a concatenate of them. Hence we would be pressed to further
expand the language and include such topological vocabulary as ‘next to’, as well as
axioms governing this relation. Seeing as this would apparently make the resulting
theory even more complicated, I prefer to avoid any such move.
Hence it is desirable that we find a wider understanding of inscription tokens that can
still reasonably be counted as nominalistic, yet does not present us with such obvious
counterexamples to NTC9. My suggestion here draws on the following illustration:
take a typestter’s letter case or a box of building bricks inscribed with letters and make
sure there are some A’s and B’s among those. The latter we treat as the atomic string
tokens. We now have two ways of specifying the range of the variables of LNTC that
are in line with NTC9 being true: either we treat any configuration of bricks, however
scattered, as an inscription token, or we declare any possible concrete horizontal, gap
free lining-up of bricks to be such a token.
Admittedly, hardcore nominalists will probably not be too happy to accept some-
thing as a concrete object that consists of two letters that are positioned on distinct
planets, as we would, according to the first idea. They are probably even less inclined
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to countenance merely possible objects. Be that as it may, I will be satisfied if at least
on some conception of nominalism that is not entirely artificial, the given interpreta-
tion of our formal language can be counted as including only concrete objects among
the values of the variables. And in regard of the fact that the simple atomic tokens I
specified, out of which all the others have to be built up, are very tangible, I shall claim
that this is indeed the case!10 Thus, NTC9 is approved and will be used as an axiom
in our nominalistic theory.
So far, I have not said anything about the relation of shape-similarity and its in-
teraction with the other primitives of the language. This relation will be needed later
on, when we attempt a nominalistic reconstruction of TC, because we are going to –
roughly speaking – distinguish tokens only up to shape-similarity in order to obtain
types.
Clearly, shape-similarity must be an equivalence relation. Also, we will demand that
all the A- and B-tokens are only similar to A- and B-tokens respectively. This seems
quite straightforward, but we still have to say more: (e) concatenates of respectively
similar inscriptions must be similar themselves, (f) for any pair of strings there is a
pair of respectively similar strings that that do not have a common part, and (g)
concatenates that are similar to each other can be partitioned into respectively similar
substrings.
The resulting axioms – much clearer than their natural language renditions – are:
NTC11. x ≈ x
NTC12. x ≈ y → y ≈ x
NTC13. x ≈ y → (y ≈ z → x ≈ z)
NTC14. Ax→ (Ay ↔ x ≈ y)
NTC15. Bx→ (By ↔ x ≈ y)
NTC16. x ≈ y ∧ z ≈ w → (Cuxz ∧ Cvyw → u ≈ v)
NTC17. ∃x′y′(x ≈ x′ ∧ y ≈ y′ ∧ ¬∃z(z v x′ ∧ z v y′))
NTC18. Czxy ∧ z ≈ z′ → ∃x′y′(x ≈ x′ ∧ y ≈ y′ ∧ Cz′x′y′)
Once again, I am convinced that the bulk of this list is quite obviously true under
the given informal interpretation. But again there is one formula among these that is
10This is actually not that great a stretch of the imagination. Basic theories of mereology charac-
teristically state the existence of arbitrarily scattered objects, much like NTC9 on the given reading.
They enjoy a reputation as paradigmatically nominalistic theories nonetheless!
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bound to raise some eyebrows: NTC17. Remember our box of bricks? Under real life
conditions, there will be a finite number of bricks in the box. So let us consider some
configuration c that uses up all the bricks there are. Now instantiate both x and y in
NTC17 with this c. The formula then states that there are strings x′ and y′ that are
both similar in shape to c and additionally have no part in common! But this is quite
clearly impossible, because by assumption all the bricks that were available have been
used to form c, and hence any other brick configuration would share a common atomic
part with c.11
We see that the finite-brick-box understanding of inscription tokens is still not ap-
propriate to all the principles I have formulated. To accept NTC17 as stating a truth,
we must accordingly help ourselves to another idealization: let the intended range of
LNTC ’s variables be the set of all the configurations of a box of infinitely many bricks,
containing just A’s and B’s.
Now all the material is on the table: let NTC be the theory in LNTC that is
axiomatized by (the universal closures of) NTC1-18!
I have already claimed that TC is a useful theory of syntax, having only one short-
coming: its platonistic ontology. I now want to offer NTC as a nominalistic alternative,
thereby removing any nasty ontological commitments. To achieve the goal of my paper
I thus have to argue that NTC is a nominalistic theory worthy of our attention and that
it allows for a reconstruction of the platonistic arguments of TC without its platonism.
This aim can be broken down into three questions that need to be answered affir-
matively: (a) Is NTC a nominalistic theory? (b) Is NTC consistent? (For if it were
not, it certainly would not be worth any attention.) (c) Is TC interpretable in NTC?
The latter two questions are as precise as one can demand – at least as soon as I specify
an applicable definition of interpretability. (a) on the other hand is more vague. Let us
turn to this first.
As I said before, it is notoriously hard to come up with a good criterion to decide
wether or not a theory is committed to abstract objects. All that I can offer here are
certain considerations of plausibility. In the case of TC it seemed quite plausible to call
the incorporated treatment of strings a platonistic one. As a reason for this, I pointed
out a feature that the entities of any interpretation that would render TC a sound
theory must share. This very feature I then declared to be characteristic – at least in
any linguistic context – of abstract rather than concrete objects. I concluded that the
11If this argument is rendered more rigorous in a set-theoretical setting, it delivers a proof that the
theory NTC to be introduced has no finite models.
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theory was platonistic because it did not admit of any purely concrete interpretation.
How do things look with NTC? In accord with what I just decreed for platonistic
theories, I shall be happy to call NTC nominalistically acceptable, if at least some
interpretation of its language can be laid out that renders the axioms true and contains
only concrete objects. I already talked about more or less clearly nominalistic interpre-
tations of the language of NTC under which some of the given axioms turn out false.
This led me to specify a certain intuitive interpretation as the intended one that we
should connect with NTC.
Regarding this – the infinite-brick-box understanding of inscription tokens – I have
pointed out its two features that might be most troubling to a nominalist: the commit-
ment to either strangely scattered objects or possibilia on the one hand and its infinity
assumption on the other.
Be that as it may, I still want to claim that one can think of the infinite-brick-box
interpretation as nominalistic. The reason for this is that the rejection of abstract objects
is the defining characteristic of nominalism, as I have emphasized from the outset. The
indicated worries arising from NTC’s intended interpretation certainly are congenial to
nominalism, but they cannot really be based on the mere rejection of abstract objects.
Wether the tokens we talk about in NTC are spatio-temporally scattered or merely
possible objects, they still are built up entirely out of concrete bricks and as such there
is not much reason to take them to be in any way abstract. Moreover, nominalism and
finitism are quite independent doctrines: nothing forces one to deny the existence of
infinitely many concrete things only because one does not accept abstract objects!
I think these considerations suffice to make the following claim look not too far-
fetched: NTC is a nominalistic theory.
Moving on to questions that are amenable to definite solutions: We shall first in-
vestigate (b), the matter of the consistency of NTC.
Theorem 1. NTC is consistent.
Proof Sketch. Consider the structure M := 〈M,AM, BM,≈M, CM〉, where M is the set
of injective finite sequences of natural numbers, AM := {{〈0, n〉}|n is even}, BM :=
{{〈0, n〉}|n is odd}, ≈M:= {〈f, g〉|f, g ∈ M 1 Lg(f)12= Lg(g) 1 \∀n < Lg(f)[f(n)
is even ⇔ g(n) is even ]}, and CM := {〈f, g, h〉|f, g, h ∈ M 1 f = g ∪ {〈Lg(g) +
n,m〉|〈n,m〉 ∈ h}}.
12Where f is a finite sequence, by ‘Lg(f)’ I mean the length of f .
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It is rather to tedious to work through all the axioms, but in the end it turns out
that M is a model of NTC. (Details in [Kozian(2010), p.81-87])13
This just leaves one question to be answered: what are the prospects of a recon-
struction within NTC of what we do in TC? More importantly, what does such a
reconstruction look like? To develop my answer to this in the rigorous way it deserves,
I shall start off with the notion of interpretability I want to use.
Definition. Interpretations between theories.14
• Let L,L′ be first-order languages, T a theory in L, S a theory in L′, ∆ an L-
formula in just the free variable ‘v0’, such that T ` ∃v0∆, and finally let I be a
function that maps:
– every n-place L′-predicate P to an L-formula ϕP (v1, . . . , vn), with at most
‘v1’, . . . ,‘vn’ occuring free.
– every n-place L′-function-symbol f to an L-formula ϕf (v1, . . . , vn, v0), with
at most ‘v0’, . . . ,‘vn’ occuring free.
– every L′-constant c to an L-formula ϕc(v0), with at most ‘v0’ occuring free.
– each variable vn to the formula p(v0 = vn+1)q.
• Let It be extended to all L′-terms as follows:
– It(σ) = I(σ) for atomic L′-terms σ
– It(pf(σ1, . . . σn)q) = p∀vi+1 . . . vi+n(∆(vi+1/v0) ∧ · · · ∧∆(vi+n/v0)∧
It(σ1)(vi+1/v0)∧· · ·∧It(σn)(vi+n/v0)→ ϕf (vi+1/v1, . . . , vi+n/vn, v0/v0))q for
n-place function terms f of L′, where i is the least number greater than the
arities of all L′-predicates, such that i > j for each j with vj occurring in
either of It(σ1), It(σ2), . . . , It(σn), or I(f).
13If one prefers a consistency result relative to some humble arithmetic theory over the set machinery
of model theory, then the idea indicated here is easily transformed into a proof that EA interprets
NTC.
14This is not the standard definition, as that would make the enterprise look hopeless from the get-go.
I could not find a treatment in the literature that does not take a detour through definitional extensions
as did [Tarski et al.(1953), p.20-30], is capable of dealing with the absence of function terms in the
target language, and treats identity as liberally as the context dictates. That is why I developped this
variant that to some might seem excessively general and formal. There is, however, a certain affinity
between this and the version in [Visser(1998), p.314f.]
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• Now let ∗ : FormL′ → FormL be defined as follows, depending on a given ∆ and
I:
– Let σ1, . . . , σn be terms of L′ and ψ be an atomic L′-formula pP (σ1, . . . σn)q.
Then ψ∗ = p∀vl+1 . . . vl+n(∆(vl+1/v0) ∧ · · · ∧∆(vl+n /v0) ∧ It(σ1)(vl+1/v0) ∧
· · ·∧It(σn)(vl+n/v0)→ ϕP (vl+1 . . . vl+n))q where l is the least number greater
than the arities of all L′-predicates, with l > j for each j, such that vj occurs
in either of It(σ1), It(σ2), . . . , It(σn), or I(P ).
– for complex formulae we demand: p¬ψq∗ = p¬ψ∗q, p(ψ → χ)q∗ = p(ψ∗ →
χ∗)q, and p∀vnψq∗ = p∀vn+1(∆(vn+1/v0)→ ψ∗)q, resp. p∃vnψq∗ =
p∃vn+1(∆(vn+1/v0) ∧ ψ∗)q
• ∗ is an interpretation of S in T if and only if: (i) for each n-place function
symbol f of L′ such that ϕf (v1, . . . , vn, v0) = I(f): T ` ∀v1 . . . vn(∆(v1/v0) ∧
· · · ∧ ∆(vn/v0) → ∃vi+1(∆(vi+1/v0) ∧ ϕf (v1, . . . , vn, vi+1) ∧ ∀vi+2(∆(vi+2/v0) ∧
ϕf (v1, . . . , vn, vi+2) → (vi = vi+1)∗))),15 where i is a suitable number > n such
that for all j with vj occurring in either ∆ or I(f): i > j, (ii) for all L′-constants
c: if ϕc(v0) = I(c), then T ` ∃vi+1(∆(vi+1/v0) ∧ ϕc(vi+1) ∧ ∀vi+2(∆(vi+2/v0) ∧
ϕc(vi+2) → (vi = vi+1)∗)), with i > j for each j such that vj occurs in either ∆
or I(c), and (iii) for each axiom ϕ of S – including the purely logical ones – we
have: T ` ϕ∗.
• S is interpretable in T (T interprets S) if and only if there is an interpretation of
S in T .
Just a quick review of what just happened. The aim is to give a systematic charac-
terization of translations between possibly very different formal languages that preserve
logical structure except for relativizing quantifiers and maybe reinterpreting identity. If
one of those can be specified that also preserves theoremhood with respect to theories
S and T – which is easily seen to be guaranteed by preservation of theoremhood of the
axioms –, then we have found what we call an interpretation of one theory in another
and we will claim that we can reconstruct S in T , or that S can be reduced to T .
A special feature of my way of handling this notion is made necessary by the fact
that TC speaks of singular types, where NTC has multiple tokens of the same shape.
15Note the variable shift produced by ∗. Hence the occurrence of different variables in the untrans-
lated identity statement.
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Hence we cannot reconstruct the behavior of identity in TC by using identity in NTC.
We do need the translation of ‘there is exactly one a’ to be a theorem, but it need only
look something like this: ‘there is exactly one a up to translated identity ’.
Let us now approach the main result of this paper: We ultimately want to prove
the interpretability of TC in NTC, thereby securing the advertised nominalization of
the theory of concatenation. Let ∆ := p(v0 = v0)q and I be a function such that
• I(‘=’) = p(v1 ≈ v2)q
• I(‘◦’) = p∀v3v4v5(v3 ≈ v1 ∧ v4 ≈ v2 ∧ Cv5v3v4 → v5 ≈ v0)q
• I(‘a’) = pAv0q
• I(‘b’) = pBv0q
• I(‘vn’) = p(v0 = vn+1)q
To obtain the interpretability theorem, we have to show that the function ∗ that
results from these according to the definition above, is an interpretation of TC in
NTC. The proof of this requires quite a lengthy series of lemmas. I have proved those
in full detail in [Kozian(2010), p.70-81]. I will not get into any of this here. Suffice
it to say that one ultimately has to make sure that all the axioms of TC are mapped
to NTC-theorems – and this includes the purely logical ones because their respective
translations do not universally turn out to be logical axioms of NTC. The process is
– again – tedious, albeit not entirely without interest. Space is limited here, however,
whence we immediately proceed to the statement of
Theorem 2. TC is interpretable in NTC.
The time has come to take stock of what was achieved in this paper. I started by
voicing a characteristically nominalistic qualm that can arise out of observing a certain
entrenched scientific practice: investigations regarding formal languages are usually
conducted in an ontologically highly suspicious environment. Not only do people work
with mathematical surrogates for essentially linguistic objects, they also seem to rely
heavily on strong ontological claims. If standard syntax theories are supposed to be
true, then abstract objects must exist!
I subsequently considered an alternative theory for dealing with formal syntax that
seemingly removed the purely mathematical subject matter but retained a lot of the
desired proof theoretical resources. This theory – TC – has the great disadvantage,
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however, that it is committed to countenance clearly abstract objects just as well, so
that the nominalistic worry could not yet be calmed by this move.
Following this assessment, I set out to develop yet another alternative theory for
doing syntax, one that could reasonably be claimed not to be ontologically committed
to abstract objects, yet would still allow us a reconstruction of what happens in TC.
This theory I named NTC.
I then argued that in spite of all the shortcomings that NTC might exhibit, it actu-
ally satisfies those requirements. There is some charitable understanding of what NTC
claims that would render it a nominalistic theory. I also gave a somewhat idiosyn-
cratic clarification of what I have in mind when I speak of ‘reconstructing’ one theory
in another, and finally I hinted at a proof that such a reconstruction of TC in NTC
is possible. I have also made it clear that NTC is a consistent and hence non-trivial
theory.
For all these reasons I can now come to a closing of the paper and declare the theory
of concatenation successfully nominalized, stripped of its unsavory ontological ballast!
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